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This paper looks at how the interaction between democracy and edu-
cation a⁄ects the quality of government. It models an economy in which
politicians of heterogeneous quality can run for o¢ ce and shows that ed-
ucation has a positive e⁄ect on the quality of selected o¢ cials only if
democratic institutions are in place. The model also ￿nds that democ-
racy has positive e⁄ect on the quality of government in countries with
high levels of education but that political institutions are not correlated
with the quality of government in countries with low levels of education.
Cross-country and panel data regressions con￿rm that the interaction be-
tween democracy and education is positively associated with the quality
of government.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature that studies the
relationship between the quality of government and each of education and de-
mocratic institutions.
We model an economy in which output depends on the quality of elected
o¢ cials and assume that politicians can expropriate the citizens. We show
that more competent politicians adopt endogenously a more honest behavior
imposing less distrotions on the economy. Next, we develop a simple model of
candidate selection in which the outcome of the electoral process is determined
by the interplay between the level of democracy and that of education. In our
framework, potential politicians decide whether they should run for o¢ ce by
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1comparing the cost of entry into politics with its expected return. We assume
that entry costs are higher in non-democratic systems and that the probability of
winning an election depends on the quality of the politician and the capacity of
the electorate of selecting the best candidate. We further assume that a poorly
educated electorate is not e⁄ective in selecting the best candidate. Therefore,
democratic institutions do not guarantee the election of better politicians if the
country has a low level of education. At the same time, high levels of education
do not a⁄ect the quality of the elected o¢ cials if the cost of entry into politics
is prohibitive. The model, therefore, predicts a positive association between
democracy and the quality of government only in countries with high levels
of education and a positive association between education and the quality of
government only in democratic countries.
The empirical part of the paper shows that the predictions of the model are
consistent with the data. In particular, we apply various estimation techniques
to cross-sectional and longitudinal data and show that the interaction between
democracy and education is positively correlated with the quality of government.
Next, we check the behavior of the marginal e⁄ect of democracy and education
and we ￿nd that, as predicted by the model, the correlation between democracy
and the quality of government is not statistically signi￿cant in countries with low
levels of education and is positive and statistically signi￿cant in countries with
high levels of education. The marginal e⁄ect of education is instead positive
and often statistically signi￿cant in countries with high levels of education.
In discussing our results, we acknowledge that we cannot make any claim
of causality because our explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous and
we do not have good instruments for education and democracy. We deal with
this issue by running a set of Monte Carlo simulations aimed at testing the
robustness of our results. We ￿nd that our results are fairly robust. Even the
presence of extreme endogeneity would not reverse our results. In the worst case
scenario, the point estimates of our parameters of interest would be statistically
insigni￿cant.
Our paper relates to three strands of the literature on the quality of gov-
ernment. The ￿rst strand consists of empirical papers aimed at testing the
determinants of institutional quality. In particular, our paper is closely related
to the work of La Porta et al. (1999), Chong and Zanforlin (2000), and Panizza
(2001). Like these papers, we emphasize the important roles of legal tradition,
geography, religion and ethnic fractionalization. Unlike these papers, we also
look at time-varying variables with particular emphasis on the role of democ-
racy, education, and the interaction between these two variables. Our paper
also quali￿es the results of the literature that argues that democracy gives the
right incentives to elected o¢ cials because it provides an instrument to oust
inept and corrupt o¢ cials (Sen, 2000, and Rivera-Batiz, 2002). In our model,
this mechanism is at work only if the electorate is su¢ ciently educated and can
identify good politicians. More in general, our model suggests that all the vari-
ables that (like education) foster the consciousness of the voters, and therefore
the accountability of politicians, should have the same positive impact on the
quality of the political elites recruited in democratic regimes. Djankov et al.
2(2010) collect data on the rules and practices of disclousure by politicians and,
consistently with our predictions, ￿nd a negative association between public
access to disclosed information and perceived corruption.
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies how the quality of
government a⁄ects economic development. In particular, our model builds on
work that shows that high quality policymakers are more likely to implement
growth-promoting macroeconomic policies (Bai and Wei, 2001) and that the
respect of economic property rights and economic liberties provides the right
set of incentives for the accumulation of human and physical capital (Besley,
1995, Gradstein, 2004, and Cervellati et al., 2008). Our paper complements this
literature and tries to explain the determinants of governance.
The paper is also related to a third strand of the economic literature which
discusses the relative merits of democracy and education in promoting economic
development. While Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Personn and Tabellini (2006,
2008 and 2009) emphasize the primacy of political institutions as a fundamental
factor to explain cross-country di⁄erences in income per capita, other authors
￿nd no evidence of a signi￿cant e⁄ect of democracy on development (Barro,
2000, and Przeworski et al., 2000).1 Djakanov et al. (2003) suggest that each
community faces a set of institutional opportunities determined by the human
and social capital of its population which, in turn, a⁄ect the quality of govern-
ment. Glaeser et al. (2004) produce empirical evidence in line with this view,
and argue that, as postulated by Lipset (1959, 1960), human capital accumula-
tion and growth cause institutional improvements.23 We try to reconcile these
two views about the primacy of human capital or democratic institutions as the
ultimate source of good policies by looking at the interaction between these two
variables and ￿nd evidence in support of the idea that democracy and human
capital complement each other.
By looking at the joint e⁄ect of education and democracy our work puts into
perspective the ￿ndings of Barro (1996) who suggests that the links between
democracy and growth are the results of the interplay between democracy and
other forces a⁄ecting economic performance, such as education. Our results
are consistent with the model of Glaeser et al. (2006) who suggest that stable
democratic institutions cannot ￿ ourish in the absence of a su¢ ciently educated
population because schooling raises the bene￿ts of civic participation, including
voting and organizing.
1Empirical papers that ￿nd that transitions to democracy are positively correlated with
economic growth include Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).
Sunde at al. (2008), instead, ￿nd that in unequal societies democracy is negatively correlated
with the rule of law. In the political science literature, the e⁄ects of democratization on
development are still debated (Carbone, 2009).
2Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that the results of Glaeser et al. (2004) are not robust to
using ￿xed e⁄ects. However, Bobba and Coviello (2007) and Castello-Climent (2008) ￿nd a
positive relationship between education and democracy, even when they control for country
￿xed e⁄ects.
3Chong and Gradstein (2009) use micro data from the World Values Surveys and ￿nd a
positive association between education and pro-democracy attitudes even after controlling for
a variety of personal characteristics.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a
theoretical model of candidate selection. In Section 3, we take our model to the
data and look at the association between a standard indicator of the quality of
government and the interaction between democracy and education. Section 4
addresses endogeneity. Section 5 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Set-Up
Production and political rents. Consider an economy populated by a
continuum of identical individuals. Each individual disposes of an endowment
of physical capital, k, used for production purposes. The production technology
f(￿) is continuous and exhibits positive but decreasing returns on k. The total
factor productivity, however, is not constant and depends on the quality of
government (q) provided by the party elected in o¢ ce. We have,
y = qf(k) (1)
Only part of the capital endowment can be used for production because
individuals are subject to the predatory behavior of the ruling party which can
expropriate a fraction ￿ of their endowment.
In modelling the behavior of politicians, we follow Max Weber (1919) who,
in his famous lecture "Politics as a Vocation," claimed:
There are two ways of making politics one￿ s vocation: Either one
lives ￿ for￿politics or one lives ￿ o⁄￿politics. [...] He who lives ￿ for￿
politics makes politics his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys
the naked possession of the power he exerts, or he nourishes his inner
balance and self-feeling by the consciousness that his life has meaning
in the service of a ￿ cause.￿ [...] He who strives to make politics a
permanent source of income lives ￿ o⁄￿politics as a vocation, whereas
he who does not do this lives ￿ for￿politics.
Formally, we assume that politicians choose the level of expropriation that
maximizes an utility function which includes both aggregate production and the
level of expropriation:
uP = ￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)￿k (2)
We think that the way in which we model the utility of politicians embodies
both kinds of making politics a vocation. Politicians derive utility (with weight
￿) from increasing the welfare of their community (and therefore politicians
may be seen as partially living a "life [which] has meaning in the service of a
￿ cause￿ ") but also (with weight 1 ￿ ￿) from the pecuniary rents obtained by
4expropriating the citizens (and therefore by making "politics as a permanent
source of income"). Note that we assume that ￿ (a parameter which could be
interpreted as capturing a politician￿ s level of honesty) is independent from q.
We therefore assume that all politicians are equally honest (or dishonest). How-
ever, we will show that, in equilibrium, high quality politicians will expropriate
less than low quality politicians. Therefore, high quality politicians will appear
to be more honest than low quality politicians even if, in fact, they have the
same preferences.





+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿k (3)
where, e k = (1￿￿)k. This formulation highlights the central trade-o⁄ faced
by the ruling political party. Direct appropriation of physical capital through
expropriation raises the pecuniary component of the utility function but, at
the same time, reduces overall production (and social welfare) and, therefore,
negatively a⁄ects the benevolent component of utility.4
Political parties. There are only two parties, one incumbent of quality qi
(which is common knowledge) and one potential entrant whose quality qe can




, with q < qi < q. The type of the potential
entrant is realized before the election takes place and is distributed according
to a density function g(qe) ￿ 0. We assume, however, that the exact realization
qe is private information.
The incumbent can run for a new term at zero cost and therefore will al-
ways take part to the electoral competition, independently on the probability
of winning. The potential entrant, on the contrary, must decide whether to pay
the entry cost ce and run for o¢ ce.
Voters. Voters￿utility is linear in consumption of the single commodity
y. They therefore aim to maximize production and minimize expropriation by
trying to select the candidate of highest quality. They observe the quality of
the incumbent but not that of the challenger.5
If the challenger is better than the incumbent the voters will observe a posi-
tive signal. We assume that the strength of this signal, and thus the probability
that the electors will vote for the challenger, is positively correlated with the
level of education of the voters E. Formally, a challenger will beat a lower




4For simplicity, we assumed expropriation of endowments rather than production; assum-
ing predation taking place directly on y jointly with a labor/leisure choice by part of the
individuals, or the existence of a formal and an informal sector characterized by di⁄erent
productivities, would deliver the same qualitative results.
5More generally, we need to assume that voters have imperfect infomation on the di⁄erence
between the quality of the incumebent and that of the challenger.
5Viceversa, whenever the quality of challenger is lower than that of the incum-
bent, the voters will observe a positive signal for the challenger with probability
1 ￿ p(E). As a break-even rule we also assume that if the two candidates are
identical, the incumbent will always win the electoral context.
This set of assumptions implies that a quali￿ed candidate has more chances
of being elected when the electorate is well educated. This is in line with the
political science literature suggesting that the quality of political participation
can a⁄ect the quality of political leadership recruited. In poor and uneducated
settings ethnic politics tend to prevail (Horowitz, 1985, and Posner et al., 2010)
and the electorate tends to exhibit greater preferences for private transfers or
clientelism (Hunington and Nelson, 1976, and Finan and Schecter, 2009).
Political regimes. There are two possible political regimes, democracy and
oligarchy, which di⁄er only with respect to the barriers to entry into political
activity. We assume that under oligarchy political competition is inexistent and
potential entrants face prohibitive entry costs, i.e. ce ! 1. Under democracy,
on the other hand, the entry cost is assumed to be equal to a positive constant
ce > 0. This parameter mimics the costs of organizing a political party or
sustaining a political campaign in a modern democracy.
This formulation implies that in oligarchic systems the incumbent will always
run unchallenged for re-election while political competition can emerge only in
democracies.
Timing. The sequence of events and decisions is as follows:
1. The quality of the potential entrant is realized. The potential entrant
decides whether to run for o¢ ce or leave the incumbent unchallenged;
2. If the potential entrant does not run for o¢ ce the incumbent is re-appointed,
otherwise voters observe the signal, elections take place and the winner
enters in o¢ ce;
3. The winning candidate takes the decision regarding expropriation, pro-
duction takes place and income is realized.
2.2 Entry decisions in Democracy
Preliminaries. We solve the model backward and investigate ￿rst the preda-
tion decision taken by political parties if elected. Once appointed a political
party strikes a balance between predation and production by solving the follow-
ing maximization problem:
Max




+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿k
where, e k = (1 ￿ ￿)k. The ￿rst order condition reads as follows:
@uP
@￿
= 0 =) ￿k￿qfe k + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0




Since, by decreasing returns on physical capital, fe k is monotonically decreas-
ing in e k and since e k = (1 ￿ ￿)k, we have:
@￿￿(q;￿;k)
@q
￿ 0 8￿ 2 [0;1] and k 2 [0;1[
For any given level of ￿, an increase in the quality of the political party in
o¢ ce increases the opportunity cost of predation in terms of lost production and
therefore reduces politicians￿incentives to expopriate the population.6 Other
things equal, more competent politicians will appear to be more honest than
less competent ones (despite sharing the same utility function) because they
optimally choose a lower level of expropriation ￿.7 In the model, therefore,
the quality of politicians has a double positive e⁄ect on aggregate production:
better governance a⁄ects production directly since it raises the total factor pro-
ductivity, but also indirectly by discouraging predatory behaviour.
We are now in a position to study the entry decision. Under democracy, the
potential entrant must decide whether to pay the ￿x cost and run for election
or leave the incumbent unchallenged. The solution of this problem depends on
the speci￿c realization of qe. We have to consider separately two di⁄erent cases,
when the entrant￿ s quality is higher than the one of the incumbent, qe > qi; and
viceversa, qe ￿ qi:
(i) High quality entrant. The potential entrant is aware of being of a
higher quality than his opponent and knows that he will win the electoral con-
test, and enjoy the utility described in (2), only if the voters observe the right
signal (i.e. with probability p(E)). Staying out will conversely entails a null
payo⁄. The potential entrant will therefore decide to challange the incumbent
if and only if the expected utility of entry into politics, net of the entry cost ce,
is greater than zero,
E [uP(entry j qe > qi)] = p(E)uP(qe;￿￿(qe)) ￿ ce > 0 (4)
This entry condition for a high quality potential entrant can be rearranged
as follows,
6The same negative relation between quality of politicians and tax rate emerges if we model
the quality of politicians simply as a di⁄erential on the propension to benevolent or pecuniary
behavior: uP = qy + (1 ￿ q)￿k, with q 2 [0;1].
7Notice that if we assumed that the quality (q) a⁄ects the productivity of politicians in
providing public goods (rather than the TFP), the model would predict that more quali￿ed
politicians obtain less rents (￿) and provide more public goods. This is in line with the ￿ndings
of Acemoglu et al. (2011) that document a negative relationship between the relative wages





Notice that, other things equal, a higher level of education increases the
likelihood of having the top quality candidate running for o¢ ce, this in turn
increases the likelihood of observing higher quality of government in equilibrium.
Conversely, and quite tautologically, higher barriers to entry discourage political
competition.
Notice also that, since uP(￿) is monotonically increasing in qe (higher quality
candidates can always ensure higher payo⁄ by simply replicating the choices
of lower quality ones) and since qe > qi, condition (5) will always hold true






This equation implicitly de￿nes a threshold level of education EIn
high such
that for any E > EIn
high any potential entrant of higher quality with respect to
the incumbent will ￿nd it optimal to run for o¢ ce. Analogously, since qe ￿ q;





Equation (7) de￿nes a new threshold level of education EOut
high < EIn
high; such
that for any E ￿ EOut
high a potential entrant of higher quality with respect to the
incumbent will be better o⁄ by not participating in the elections.
These results allow us to characterize the decisions of a high quality chal-
lenger independently on the actual realization of qe:
Lemma 1 For any E > EIn
high all candidates of higher quality than the incum-
bent ￿nd it optimal to run for o¢ ce, while for any E ￿ EIn
high they do not take







depends on the speci￿c realization of qe:
(ii) Low quality entrant. If the potential entrant is of lower quality than
the incumbent, in case of candidature he will win the election only if voters
observe the wrong signal (i.e. with probability 1￿p(E)). Not running for o¢ ce,
on the other hand, will entail a payo⁄ equal to zero. The potential entrant will
therefore run for election if and only if:
E [uP(entry jqe ￿ qi)] = (1 ￿ p(E))uP(qe;￿￿(qe)) ￿ ce > 0 (8)
The entry condition reads therefore as follows,




8When the potential entrant is of lower quality, education discourages entry
because it decreases the likelihood of a wrong decision by part of the voters.
Notice that, since uP(￿) is monotonically increasing in qe and since qe > q,
condition (9) is always veri￿ed (i.e. independently on the actual realization of





This equation implicitly de￿nes a threshold level of education EIn
low such that
for any E ￿ EIn
low potential entrants of lower quality than the incumbent will
always ￿nd it optimal to run for o¢ ce. Furthermore, since qe < qi, condition
(9) will fail to hold whenever:




This equation de￿nes a fourth threshold level on education EOut
low > EIn
low
such that for any E ￿ EOut
low any potential entrant of lower quality than the
incumbent will not run for o¢ ce. Therefore,
Lemma 2 For any E < EIn
low all candidates of lower quality than the incumbent
￿nd it optimal to run for o¢ ce, while for any E ￿ EOut
low they decide to stay out






, the entry decision
depends on the speci￿c realization of qe:
For the sake of expositional simplicity, but without any loss of generality, we
assume that ce is such that EOut
high > EOut






2.3 A comparison between political regimes
We now conduct a comparative statics exercise aimed at comparing the im-
pact of di⁄erent political institutions on the quality of elected o¢ cials, and the
way in which these institutions interact with education in determining electoral
outcomes.
From conditions (10) and (11) we know that for very low levels of educa-
tion only potential entrants of quality lower than the incumbent ￿nd it optimal
to run for o¢ ce. In this context, imposing prohibitive barriers to entry will
raise the average quality of government by discouraging low quality candidates
from trying to overthrown high quality incumbents. In well educated countries,
instead, only the decisions of potential entrants of quality higher than the in-
cumbent will be a⁄ected by changes in the political regime. More democratic
and open institutions, in this case, will encourage the best candidates to run for
o¢ ce thereby raising the average quality of government. For intermediate levels
of education, it is impossible to make an assessment between the two regimes:
8This essentialy entails a cost of entry ce su¢ ciently high.
9democracies will encourage higher competition increasing the likelihood of hav-
ing incumbents entering into o¢ ce independently of their type.
Formally, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 The level of education a⁄ects the comparison between demo-
cratic and oligarchic systems in terms of selection of the politicians:
(i) For any E > EIn
high a democracy is associated with a higher expected
quality of elected o¢ cials (and lower expropriation) than an oligarchic system;
(ii) For any E < EIn
low an oligarchic system is associated with a higher
expected quality of elected o¢ cials (and lower expropriation) as compared with
a democracy;






the two systems are identical ex-ante in
terms of expected quality of government.
Proof. First consider E > EIn
high: Under democracy, by Lemmata 1 and 2,
and since EIn
high > EOut
low , only potential entrants of quality qi 2 ]qi;q] will run







[p(E)qe + (1 ￿ p(E))qi]dg(qe)











qi = qi and since higher quality
elected o¢ cials optimally impose a lower ￿￿.
Next, consider E < EIn
low: In this region by Lemmata 1 and 2, and since
EOut
high > EIn
























qi = qi and since lower quality
elected o¢ cials optimally impose a higher ￿￿.






. In this intermediate area both high
and low quality candidates may decide to run for o¢ ce (or not) depending on
the speci￿c realization of qe. It is therefore impossible to make a comparison
between the expected quality of government in the two systems.
Notice also that in our model the level of education a⁄ects the quality of
elected o¢ cials only under democratic regimes, by encouraging high quality
candidates to run for o¢ ce and discouraging low quality ones, while it plays no
role in oligarchies where political participation is restricted to the ruling elite.
This is recorded in the following,
Proposition 4 The type of political regime a⁄ects the relationship between ed-
ucation and selection of the politicians:
(i) Under a democratic regime, the expected quality of elected o¢ cials is
monotonically increasing in the level of education. The level of expropriation is




@E(￿￿ j democracy )
@E
￿ 0
(ii) Under an oligarchic regime, the expected quality of elected o¢ cials and




@E(￿￿ j oligarchy )
@E
= 0
Proof. The result (i) follows since by Lemmata 1 and 2 any increase (de-
crease) in education increases (decreases) the likelihood of having candidates
of higher (lower) quality than the incumbent running for o¢ ce. Furthermore,
an increase (decrease) in education also increases (decreases) the probability of
winning of a high (low) quality candidate after the entry decision has been taken.
The result (ii) follows from the de￿nition of oligarchy.
3 Empirical Relevance
In this section we take our model to the data and look at the correlation be-
tween the quality of government and each of education and democracy. It should
be clear from the outset that we have no convincing way to identify a causal
relationship going from our variables of interest to the quality of government.
Therefore, the objective of this section is to check whether the partial correla-
tions between the quality of government and each of education and democracy
are consistent with the results of our model, without making any claim on the
11causality of these partial correlations. In the next section we investigate the
endogeneity problem. We show that our results are robust to allowing for a
mild form of endogeneity.
3.1 The Data
We measure the quality of government with an aggregate index obtained from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) built up by jointly considering
corruption and competency indicators. In particular, our quality of government
index (QOG) is the simple average of the ICRG variables ￿Corruption,￿￿Law
and Order,￿and ￿Bureaucracy Quality.￿Note that, in line with our model which
suggests that less competent politicians endogenously adopt more predatory
behaviours, corruption and bureaucracy quality are highly correlated in the
data.9
The aggregate index of quality of government ranges between 0 and 100,
with higher values being associated with higher quality of government. The
average value of the index was approximately 52 in the 1980s, 58 in the 1990s
and 55 in the 2000s (Table A1). The quality of government index is fairly stable
and most of the variance of the index comes from its cross-country variation
(the ￿between,￿standard deviation of the index is about 20 and the ￿within,￿
standard deviation is approximately 7, Tables A2-A4).
We measure democracy (DEMOC) using an average of the Polity and Free-
dom House indexes of democracy. Our measure of democracy ranges between
0 and 10 (again, with higher values associated with greater levels of democ-
racy). While the average value of the index increased from 4.8 in the 1980s
to 7.1 in the 2000s, the dispersion of the index decreased markedly with the
cross-country standard deviation going from 3.5 in the 1980s to 2.8 in the 2000s
(Table A1). Again, the cross-country variance of the index is much larger than
the within-country variance.
For our third variable of interest we rely on the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset
on educational attainment. We measure education (EDUC) with the average
number of years of education attained by the adult population. In the data,
this variable ranges between 2.8 and 13. Its average value increased from 5.2
in the 1980s to 7.5 in the 2000s. Its standard deviation, instead, remained
constant at approximately 2.8. As for the previous two variables, the cross-
country standard deviation of education is much larger than the within-country
standard deviation (2.9 versus 0.8, Table A3).
In estimating the relationship between quality of government and each of
democracy and education, we follow La Porta et al. (1999) and control for the
log of GDP per capita, legal origin, religion, ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
and latitude. Following Ades and Di Tella (1999), we also control for trade
9The correlation between the ICRG index of bureaucratic quality and that of control of
corruption is 0.63 (the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant at the one percent con￿dence level).
A regression of the index of control of corruption over that of bureaucratic quality yields a
coe¢ cient of 0.8 and a t-statistics of 11.8.
12openness.10
3.2 Cross-country estimates
We start by looking at the cross-country relationship between the quality of
government (QOG) and each of democracy and education by running separate
regressions for the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 1 show
that education (EDUC) is never signi￿cantly correlated with QOG and that
democracy (DEMOC) is positively but not always signi￿cantly correlated with
QOG.
These estimates, however, assume that the e⁄ects of democracy and educa-
tion on the quality of government are independent of each other. Our model,
instead, predicts a positive interaction between these variables. It suggests that
we should ￿nd a positive correlation between democracy and quality of govern-
ment only in countries with high average levels of education. In countries with
intermediate levels of education democracy should not matter and in countries
with low levels of education democracy may even be associated with the selection
of low quality politicians. The model also predicts that education should have
a positive e⁄ect on the quality of government in democracies and be irrelevant
in non-democratic regimes.
We test for the presence of an interaction between education and democracy
by estimating the following model:
QOGi = ￿ + ￿(DEMOCi ￿ DEMOC) + ￿(EDUCi ￿ EDUC) +
+￿(DEMOCi ￿ DEMOC)(EDUCi ￿ EDUC) + Xi￿ + "i
Within this set up,
@QOG
@DEMOC = ￿ + ￿(EDUCi ￿ EDUC), with ￿ measur-
ing the relationship between democracy and the quality of government for the
country with average level of education and ￿ measuring how the level of educa-
tion a⁄ects the relationship between democracy and the quality of government.
Similarly,
@QOG
@EDUC = ￿ + ￿(DEMOCi ￿ DEMOC), with ￿ measuring the rela-
tionship between education and the quality of government for the country with
average level of democracy and ￿ measuring how the level of democracy a⁄ects
the relationship between education and the quality of government.
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 1 show that ￿ is always positive and statistically
signi￿cant, indicating that there is a positive relationship between democracy
and the quality of government for the country with the average level of educa-
tion (in the year 2000 the group of countries with a level of education around
the cross-country average of 7.5 included Ecuador, South Africa, Mexico, Jor-
dan, and Sri Lanka). They also show that ￿ is never statistically signi￿cant,
indicating that there is no robust relationship between education and the qual-
ity of government for the country with the average level of democracy (in the
year 2000, the group of countries with a level of democracy around the cross-
country average of 7.1 included Thailand, Mozambique, Colombia, Ukraine, and
10Our control variables and their sources are described in Table A5.
13Turkey). Finally, Table 1 shows that ￿ is always positive and statistically sig-
ni￿cant, supporting the idea of a positive interaction between democracy and
quality of government.
Figure 1 plots the partial correlation between DEM ￿ EDUC and QOG
for each of the three sub-periods studied in Table 1 and for all the sub-periods
pooled together. It suggests that the the point estimates of Table 1 are not
driven by outliers.
The bottom panel of Table 1 evaluates the relationship between democracy
and the quality of government for countries with a level of education which
is one standard deviation below the cross-country average (examples of such
countries are Uganda, Pakistan, Laos, and Haiti) and for countries with a level
of education which is one standard deviation above the cross-country average
(Russia, Latvia, Romania, and Switzerland). We ￿nd no signi￿cant relationship
between democracy and the quality of government for countries with low levels
of education and a strong and signi￿cant correlation between democracy and the
quality of government for countries with high levels of education. The second
result is fully consistent with the predictions of our model. The ￿rst result is
consistent with the predictions of our model if we assume that countries which
are one standard deviation below the average level of education are still above
the thresholds below which democracy starts having a negative e⁄ect on the
quality of government.
We also look at the relationship between the quality of the government and
education for di⁄erent levels of democracy (countries which in the year 2000
had a level of democracy one standard deviation below the cross-country av-
erage include Morocco, Kuwait, Chad, and Mauritania and countries that in
the year 2000 had a level of democracy one standard deviation above the cross-
country average include Greece, Japan, Chile, and Italy). In all cases, we ￿nd
a negative correlation for low levels of democracy and a positive correlation for
high levels of democracy. If we focus on the 1980s, we ￿nd that the negative
correlation for low levels of democracy is statistically signi￿cant at the 5 per-
cent con￿dence level but the positive correlation for high levels of democracy is
not statistically signi￿cant. For the 1990s and 2000s, instead, we ￿nd that the
correlation between education and quality of government is positive and statis-
tically signi￿cant in countries with high levels of democracy and negative and
insigni￿cant for countries with low levels of democracy. The results of the 1990s
and 2000s are thus fully consistent with the predictions of our model which sug-
gest that education should have a positive e⁄ect in countries with high levels of
democracy and should not matter in countries with low levels of democracy.
Figure 2 uses the results of the 2000s regression to plot the marginal e⁄ect
of education at di⁄erent levels of democracy. It shows that the relationship is
negative and statistically signi￿cant for countries where the democracy index
is below 2.5 and positive and statistically signi￿cant for countries where the
democracy index is above 9.11
11In the 2000s there were 28 countries that in the 2000s had a democracy index below 2.5
(Saudi Arabia; North Korea; Iraq; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; Myanmar; Libya; Afghanistan;
14Figure 3 uses the results of the 2000s regression to plot the relationship
between the quality of government and democracy at di⁄erent levels of edu-
cation. It shows that the relationship is negative and statistically signi￿cant
for countries with extremely low levels of education (below one year of average
schooling) and is positive and statistically signi￿cant for all countries in which
average education is above 7 years.12 The results are thus fully consistent with
the predictions of our model.
In the ￿rst two columns of Table 2 we check whether or results are robust
to using an alternative measure of education. In particular, we substitute the
Barro and Lee (2010) measure of average years of education with the Vanhanen
(2003a, 2003b) index of knowledge distribution (EDUC1) computed as the
simple average of literates as a percentage of adult population and the number
of students at universities or other higher education institutions per 100,000
inhabitants of the country. The index is rescaled to range between 0 and 100
(in the 1980s the average value of the index was 43, in the 1990s the average
value had increased to 51; the cross-country standard deviation of the index is
approximately 21 and the within-country standard deviation is about 4). While
this index is not available for the 2000s and is less commonly used than the
Barro and Lee measure of the stock of education, it has the advantage of being
available at annual frequency (the Barro and Lee measure of education is only
available at a 5-year frequency). Therefore, it can be used to estimate panel
regressions that use annual data.13 We ￿nd that substituting EDUC with
EDUC1 does not a⁄ect our results (this is not surprising since the correlation
between the two variables is 0.87).
In the last three columns of Table 2, we re-estimate the models of columns 2,
4, and 6 of Table 1 by using a robust regression method which puts less weight
on outliers (in particular, we use the rreg command of Stata) and ￿nd results
which are basically identical to those of Table 1. This con￿rms that our ￿ndings
are not driven by outliers.
3.3 Panel regressions
In Table 3, we use ten year averages to estimate random and ￿xed e⁄ects mod-
els by pooling the data for the three decades of the regressions of Table 1. We
start with a random e⁄ects model without the interaction between democracy
Cuba; Syria; Qatar; Laos; China; Sudan; Swaziland; Eritrea; Belarus; Vietnam; United Arab
Emirates; Equatorial Guinea; Oman; Bhutan; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Zimbabwe; Cameroon;
Kazakhstan; Egypt) and 39 countries that in the 2000s had a democracy index above 9 (Bul-
garia; Latvia; South Africa; Panama; Israel; Taiwan; Greece; Estonia; Japan; Chile; Czech
Republic; Slovakia; France; Mauritius; Lithuania; Poland; Belgium; Costa Rica; Hungary;
Italy; United Kingdom; Slovenia; Germany; Spain; Ireland; New Zealand; Cyprus; Portugal;
Uruguay; Austria; Australia; Finland; Sweden; Norway; Netherlands; United States; Switzer-
land; Denmark; Canada).
12In the 2000s there was only one country with average education below one year (Mozam-
bique) and there were 73 countries with average education above 7 years.
13Moreover, by focusing on both the top (tertiary enrollment) and bottom (basic literacy)
parts of the distribution of education outcome, this index may do a better job at capturing
inequalities in the distribution of education.
15and education (column 1) and again we ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of
democracy and a positive but insigni￿cant e⁄ect of education. We ￿nd similar
results when we control for the interaction between democracy and education
and estimate the e⁄ect of democracy and education at their respective mean
value (column 2). As in Table 1, we ￿nd that the interactive term is positive
and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that democracy and education are com-
plementary. In column 3, we estimate the model without interaction but with
country ￿xed e⁄ects (this speci￿cation does not allow to include time-invariant
controls) and ￿nd that neither education nor democracy are statistically signif-
icant. However, when we allow for an interactive e⁄ect we ￿nd that democracy
is statistically signi￿cant (indicating that for the country with the average level
of education democracy is positively correlated with the quality of government)
and so is the interactive term capturing complementarities between democracy
and education. This is a remarkable result if one considers that in the ￿xed
e⁄ects model the limited within-country variance of democracy and education
ampli￿es the downward bias brought about by the presence of measurement
error.
Figure 4 uses the results of the ￿xed e⁄ects regression to plot the relationship
between the quality of government and education at di⁄erent levels of democ-
racy.14 It shows that, as predicted by our model, the relationship is insigni￿cant
for low and intermediate levels of democracy but it becomes positive and sig-
ni￿cant when the democracy index surpasses 9. When we plot the relationship
between the quality of government and democracy at di⁄erent levels of educa-
tion (Figure 5) we ￿nd that the relationship is negative (but not statistically
signi￿cant) for countries with low levels of education (less than 4 years) and
becomes positive and statistically signi￿cant when average education reaches 8
years.
In Table 4 we estimate panel regressions using 5 year averages instead of 10
year averages and ￿nd that the results are qualitatively similar to those of Table
3. As before, we ￿nd that the relationship between education and the quality of
government is positive and statistically signi￿cant for high level of democracy,
but now we also ￿nd that the relationship between these two variables is negative
and signi￿cant for extremely low values of democracy (Figure 6).15
In Table 5 we repeat the experiment using annual data and the Vanhanen
(2003a, 2003b) index of knowledge distribution (EDUC1). We now ￿nd that
both education and democracy are positively correlated with QOG when they
are evaluated at their mean value and, as before, we ￿nd a positive and statis-
tically signi￿cant coe¢ cient for the interactive term. Figure 8 shows that the
relationship between education and the quality of government is always positive
and becomes statistically signi￿cant for countries with intermediate and high
levels of democracy. When we look at the relationship between democracy and
quality of government we ￿nd the usual result of a negative but insigni￿cant
14We use the ￿xed e⁄ects regression because a Hausman test rejects the null that the random
e⁄ects model is consistent (￿(6) = 10:75, p = 0:09).
15The graph is based on the results of the ￿xed e⁄ects regressions because a Hausman test
show that the random e⁄ects regression is not consistent (￿2(5) = 13:08, p = 0:02).
16relationship for countries with low level of education and a positive and signif-
icant relationship for countries with intermediate and high levels of education
(Figure 9).
While many of our explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous, one
variable we are particularly worried about is the log of GDP per capita, as
there is strong evidence that institutional quality has a causal e⁄ect on the
level of development (Acemoglu et al., 2001). While we do not have a good
instrument for the level of GDP, we do have a good instrument for GDP growth.
Recognizing that, with ￿xed e⁄ects and annual data, the level of GDP and GDP
growth are closely related concepts, in Table 6 we replace the log of GDP per
capita with GDP growth (GROWTH) and then instrument GDP growth with
the real external shock ￿rst used by Jaimovich and Panizza (2006). We ￿nd
that the results of the IV regressions are essentially identical to those of the
standard regressions which, in turn, are similar to those in which we control for
the log of GDP instead of GDP growth.
Finally, we recognize that the quality of government is likely to be persis-
tent and we estimate the relationship between QOG and each of education and
democracy by using a dynamic panel estimator. Column 1 of Table 7 reports
the results of the GMM di⁄erence estimator originally proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991).16 The results of the dynamic panel estimations show strong
persistence (with the ￿rst and second lag being highly signi￿cant) and con￿rm
our previous result of a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of education, democracy,
and of the interaction between these two variables. The model also passes the
standard speci￿cation tests: the residuals exhibit ￿rst order autocorrelation but
no second order autocorrelation and the Sargan test does not reject the null on
the appropriateness of our exclusion restrictions. We also used the system GMM
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
because, under certain conditions, this model allows to make casual statements,
but the Sargan test always rejected our exclusion restrictions (Columns 2 and
3 of table 7).
3.4 Discussion
The model developed in Section 2 yields the following six predictions: (i) Ed-
ucation and democracy are complementary for the quality of government; (ii)
Democracy has a positive e⁄ect on the quality of government in educated soci-
eties; (iii) Education has a positive e⁄ect on the quality of government in demo-
cratic societies; (iv) Democracy is irrelevant in countries with intermediate levels
of education; (v) Education is irrelevant in non-democratic societies; and (vi)
Democracy has a negative e⁄ect on the quality of government in countries with
very low levels of education. We think that our results are fully consistent with
the ￿rst four predictions. In particular, we always ￿nd that the interactive e⁄ect
￿ is positive and statistically signi￿cant, that the marginal e⁄ect of democracy
16We use all available lags as instrument and adjust the standard errors using Windmeijer
(2005) ￿nite sample correction. We consider a model with two lags because in the model with
one lags we could not reject the null of no second order autocorrelation of the residuals.
17is positive and statistically signi￿cant for countries with high levels of education
and not signi￿cant in countries with intermediate levels of education, and that
the marginal e⁄ect of education is positive and signi￿cant in democracies. Our
results are also broadly consistent with the ￿fth prediction. Although, we have
a couple of speci￿cations in which the marginal e⁄ect of education is negative
and statistically signi￿cant at low levels of democracy, most of our regressions
￿nd that education is not statistically signi￿cant in non-democratic countries.
Our results, instead, are not consistent with the sixth prediction. In partic-
ular, we ￿nd that at low levels of education, the marginal e⁄ect of democracy is
never statistically signi￿cant. We think that this is due to a multicollinearity
problem caused by the fact that countries with very low levels of education tend
to have low levels of democracy. For instance, our sample only includes one
country (Mozambique) with very low average education (less than three years)
and an index of democracy greater than 7.
4 Non-Robustness Analysis
The main issue with the estimations of Section 3 relates to the endogeneity of
our variables of interest and of some of our controls. The quality of government
is likely to have a direct e⁄ect on education and GDP per capita and also have
an either direct or indirect e⁄ect on democracy and trade openness. Although,
we tried to deal with the endogeneity problem by using panel data and di⁄erent
GMM estimators, we are not convinced to have fully dealt with the problem.
In the absence of proper instruments there is no solution to the endogeneity
problem. Therefore, in this Section we follow Bourguignon et al. (2007) and
explore the magnitude of the potential bias in the estimation of our parameters
of interest. In a sense, we check how "non-robust" our results are under di⁄erent
assumptions on the severity of the endogeneity problem.
Our objective is to estimate the following model:
Qi = ￿ + Xi￿ + Wi￿ + ui
Where Q is the quality of government, X is a matrix of endogenous vari-
ables (democracy, education, the interaction between democracy and educa-
tion, GDP per capita, and openness) and W is a matrix of exogenous variables
(Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, legal origin, religion, and latitude). Because
of endogeneity, X and u are not orthogonal and the vector b ￿ will be a biased
estimator of ￿ (possibly also causing a bias in b ￿).
If we had a set of valid instruments (i.e., a set of variables correlated with X
but uncorrelated with u), we could use an IV estimator and obtain an unbiased
estimator of the vector ￿. In the absence of such a set of instruments, we can
compute how the correlation between u and X a⁄ects the bias of b ￿ and then
correct for this bias.
To see how this can be done let us start by assuming, without loss of gen-
18erality, that all variables are endogenous and have mean zero.17 The expected
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As E (X0u) = cov(Xu)N (where N is the number of observations), we can
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By recalling that ￿Xu = cov(Xu)=(￿x￿u), we have,





Where ￿u is the standard deviation of u and ￿Xu￿x is a k￿1 vector in which
each element is the product between the standard deviation of the kth variable
in X and the correlation between u and the kth variable in X.18 In order to
evaluate the bias we need a guess about ￿u (which can only be estimated if we
have an unbiased estimate of ￿) and ￿Xu. We can instead estimate ￿x.
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Equation (16) allows us to compute the bias of the OLS estimator for any
vector of correlation coe¢ cients ￿Xu￿x. Although the correlation coe¢ cients are
unknown, they need to range between ￿1 and 1. We can thus build bounds for
the coe¢ cients of our variables of interest by randomly drawing a large number
of correlation coe¢ cients and applying them to equation (16).
17The following discussion is close to that in Bourguignon et al. (2007). We repeat it here
for ease of reference.
18The typical element in this vector is ￿xku￿xk.
19In particular, we start with the cross-sectional OLS model of Table 1 col-
umn 6 and associate each of our endogenous variables (education, democracy,
the interaction between education and democracy, GDP per capita and trade
openness) to a random draw from uniform distribution de￿ned over (0;c), substi-
tute these correlations into Equation (16), and use B to recover ￿. We replicate
this exercise 10;000 times for each value of c allowing c to range between ￿1
and 1, with increments of 0:1 (for a total of 200;000 simulations). As in Bour-
guignon et al. (2007), we also impose some restrictions on the values of ￿. In
particular, we drop all draws for which the impact of GDP per capita, Common
law, German law, and latitude is non-positive.19 We then use the remaining
observations to look at how the correlation between the endogenous variables
and the error term a⁄ects the estimation of our variables of interest.
Figure 10 shows how di⁄erent assumptions about the possible correlation
between the error term and each of the endogenous variables a⁄ect the coe¢ cient
associated with the interaction between democracy and education (the solid line
plots the average value and the dashed lines plot the values at the 5th and 95th
percentile of the distribution). When we set corr=0 we obtain the same value
(0:564) that we obtained with the OLS estimates of Column 6, Table 1. This
is not surprising because the OLS estimator assumes ￿Xu = 0. The ￿gure
also shows that with correlation equal to 0, the whole distribution of the bias
collapses to one point.20
The ￿gure also shows that allowing for a negative correlation would strengthen
our result of a positive interactive e⁄ect between education and democracy.
However, we do not think that this is the likely direction of the bias. It is in
fact more likely that our endogenous variables are positively correlated with the
error term. The graph shows that the average value of the coe¢ cient for the
interaction between democracy and education remains positive if the correlation
coe¢ cient is lower than 0:4 and that the coe¢ cient at the bottom 5th percentile
of the distribution remains positive if the correlation coe¢ cient is lower than
0:4. Therefore, our results are robust to allowing for a fairly severe endogeneity
problem. Moreover, Figure 9 shows that the coe¢ cient at the 95th percentile of
the distribution is always positive, indicating that the relationship between the
quality of government and the interaction between democracy and education
is non-negative even if we assume that our estimation su⁄er from an extreme
endogeneity problem.
We can now look at the marginal e⁄ect of education on the quality of govern-
ment. In Section 3.2 we found that this marginal e⁄ect is positively sloped and
that the marginal e⁄ect is positive when the index of democracy is above 6 and
positive and statically signi￿cant when the index of democracy is above 7. The
19The restrictions are never binding when c ranges between ￿0:2 and 0:2, but they exclude
most observation when we allow c to take larger values. For instance, when c = 1, only 175
draws (out of 10;000) are retained. We think that these restrictions are reasonable and well
grounded in the existing literature. However, the results are basically identical if we do not
include these restrictions.
20This should clarify the fact that Figure 9 plots the distribution of the corrected estima-
tors obtained with the Monte Carlo simulation and not the sum of the distributions of each
corrected estimator.
20marginal e⁄ect of education is instead negative when the index of democracy is
below 6 and negative and statistically signi￿cant when the index of democracy
is below 3. Figure 11 plots the marginal e⁄ect of education for di⁄erent values of
the democracy index and di⁄erent assumptions on the correlation between the
error term and the endogenous variables. The ￿gure shows that the results are
similar to the OLS estimates when the correlations coe¢ cient ranges between
￿1 and 0:2.
Next, we look at the marginal e⁄ect of democracy on the quality of govern-
ment. Figure 3, showed that the OLS regressions found a positive e⁄ect when
average education surpasses 5 years, and a positive and statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ect when average education surpasses 7 years (this is also the mean of the
average level of education in our sample). The e⁄ect of democracy was instead
negative and statistically signi￿cant only for countries in which average educa-
tion is below one year (and in the sample there is only one country with such low
level of average education). Again, we ￿nd results which are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those of the OLS regressions if we allow for correlation
coe¢ cients which range between ￿1 and 0:2 (Figure 12). However, we ￿nd that
that the slopes of the marginal e⁄ects become negative and the coe¢ cients are
never signi￿cant if the correlation between the error term and the endogenous
variables is 0:4 or greater.
Summing up, we ￿nd that endogeneity would never reverse our results. In
the worst case scenario, endogeneity would lead to statistically insigni￿cant
estimates of our parameters of interest.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we start from the assumption that the quality of government is
a crucial determinant of economic development and then we look at how the
interplay between education and democratic institutions a⁄ect the quality of
elected o¢ cials. In doing so, we synthesize recent research that highlights the
importance of political institutions as a fundamental factor explaining cross-
country di⁄erences in income per capita with work that argues that institutional
improvements and development is driven by social and human capital.
We provide this synthetic view by proposing a simple theory of candidate se-
lection in which both education and political institutions matter. In the model,
politicians of di⁄erent quality decide whether they should run for o¢ ce by eval-
uating the cost of entry into politics and the probability of winning the electoral
context. We show that democratic institutions and education complement each
other. Democracy leads to the election of better politicians only if the level of
education is above a certain threshold. Improvements in the level of education,
in turn, can only a⁄ect the quality of the elected o¢ cials if the cost of entry
into politics is not prohibitive.
We bring our model to the data and provide evidence corroborating its main
theoretical predictions. In particular, we show that: (i) the interaction between
democracy and education is always a positively and signi￿cantly correlated with
21the quality of government; (ii) the correlation between democracy and quality
of government is statistically signi￿cant only in countries with high levels of
education; and (iiii) that the marginal e⁄ect of education is positive and sta-
tistically signi￿cant in countries with high levels of democracy. We also run a
set of Monte Carlo simulations which show that our results are not driven by
reverse causality.
By looking explicitly at the interaction between democracy and education,
we show how these two variables complement each other in the selection of high
quality policymakers which ultimately guarantee good governance.
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31Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1980s 1990s 2000s
DEMOC 2.832*** 3.260*** 1.188 1.661** 1.245* 1.652***
(0.78) (0.79) (0.76) (0.70) (0.63) (0.63)
EDUC -0.46 -1.684 0.577 0.00494 0.834 0.606
(1.41) (1.35) (0.89) (0.94) (0.71) (0.71)
DEM*EDUC 0.797*** 0.628*** 0.564***
(0.26) (0.20) (0.16)
OPEN 0.0637 0.0777* 0.0241 0.0362 0.0575* 0.0592**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(GDP PC) 7.972** 8.854*** 6.389*** 7.271*** 5.274*** 6.294***
(3.08) (3.01) (2.00) (2.06) (1.58) (1.62)
ELF 22.01** 19.39** 0.742 1.221 3.895 5.279
(9.36) (8.35) (6.43) (5.68) (4.99) (4.68)
COMMON LAW -3.017 -18.78* 14.11*** 10.02** 22.89*** 19.77***
(11.61) (11.26) (4.43) (4.26) (4.05) (4.15)
FRENCH LAW -3.673 -21.28* 7.145 2.642 11.90*** 9.029**
(11.30) (11.01) (5.51) (5.33) (4.27) (4.24)
GERMAN LAW 9.037 -4.954 16.58*** 12.58** 23.14*** 19.17***
(12.29) (11.47) (5.39) (4.83) (4.52) (4.45)
SCAND. LAW -6.176 -11.55 10.55 8.476 30.80*** 30.47***
(20.20) (18.07) (8.10) (7.20) (7.49) (7.29)
CATHOLIC -0.129* -0.0925 -0.0371 -0.0253 0.0467 0.0395
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
PROTESTANT 0.144 -0.0207 0.0779 0.0289 -0.00877 -0.0568
(0.19) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
MUSLIM -0.0662 -0.0702 -0.00809 -0.0222 0.0549 0.0427
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
abs(Latitude) 42.24*** 31.91** 37.82*** 32.18*** 44.88*** 36.91***
(14.92) (13.77) (9.84) (9.24) (8.72) (8.97)
Constant -46.68** -27.44 -28.47** -23.54 -44.91*** -36.29***
(21.04) (23.98) (13.81) (15.56) (11.13) (11.82)
Observations 88 88 104 104 106 106
R-squared 0.683 0.728 0.77 0.797 0.823 0.844
DEMO+1SD*SCH 5.652 3.545 3.346
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEMO-1SD*SCH 0.868 -0.223 -0.041
p value 0.361 0.81 0.954
SCH+1SDEMOC 0.708 1.889 2.30
p value 0.586 0.036 0.01
SCH-1SDEMOC -4.076 -1.879 -1.087
p value 0.025 0.151 0.192
Table 1: Cross-country OLS regressions
32Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Alternative measure of education Robust regressions
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 2000s
DEMOC 3.058*** 1.270** 3.410*** 1.641** 2.019***





EDUC -1.878 -0.818 0.821
(1.47) (0.88) (0.73)
DEM*EDUC1 0.762*** 0.764*** 0.531***
(0.26) (0.19) (0.17)
OPEN 0.0649 0.0106 0.0785* 0.0383 0.0536**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
ln(GDP PC) 8.707*** 9.276*** 9.515*** 8.304*** 5.612***
(2.19) (1.71) (3.02) (1.87) (1.62)
ELF 18.27** 0.0596 19.61** 0.602 7.179
(8.26) (5.51) (9.06) (5.20) (4.47)
COMMON LAW -22.51*** 4.608 -19.64 9.313* 21.07***
(7.60) (4.28) (12.51) (5.19) (4.32)
FRENCH LAW -22.03*** 0.826 -22.49* 0.28 10.09**
(7.22) (4.75) (12.33) (5.39) (4.47)
GERMAN LAW -13.26* 7.521 -7.76 10.36 20.76***
(6.81) (4.85) (12.71) (6.30) (5.31)
SCAND. LAW -22.83* 0.445 -15.34 6.246 31.70***
(13.55) (7.46) (19.14) (9.20) (8.08)
CATHOLIC -0.106* -0.0655* -0.0954 -0.0224 0.0559
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
PROTESTANT 0.0818 0.111 0.00408 0.0321 -0.0504
(0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.07)
MUSLIM -0.0801 -0.0452 -0.0795 -0.0451 0.0771
(0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
abs(Latitude) 28.46** 20.18* 31.63* 31.51*** 38.88***
(12.82) (10.69) (17.35) (11.03) (9.56)
Constant -23.88 -31.19** -31.61 -30.25** -33.57***
(16.97) (13.66) (24.80) (14.44) (12.66)
Observations 109 127 88 104 106
R-squared 0.708 0.773 0.684 0.775 0.834
Table 2: Cross-country regressions: Sensitivity Analysis
33Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random e⁄ects Fixed e⁄ects
DEMOC 1.121** 1.337*** 0.708 0.846*
(0.45) (0.42) (0.57) (0.51)
EDUC 0.935 0.932 1.871 2.068
(0.71) (0.71) (1.52) (1.47)
DEM*EDUC 0.288** 0.263*
(0.13) (0.15)
OPEN 0.0342 0.0371 -0.0217 -0.0257
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
ln(GDP PC) 6.037*** 5.743*** 3.781 0.44
(1.55) (1.56) (3.29) (3.35)
ELF 6.061 5.813
(5.80) (5.45)
COMMON LAW 18.14*** 17.06***
(4.18) (4.11)
FRENCH LAW 10.54** 9.172*
(4.97) (4.73)
GERMAN LAW 21.78*** 20.61***
(5.32) (4.94)










Constant -44.38*** -28.25** 8.899 53.42*
(11.40) (11.80) (30.73) (28.31)
Observations 298 298 304 304
R-squared 0.189 0.212
Number of countries 106 106 109 109
Table 3: Panel data regressions: 10-year periods
34Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random e⁄ects Fixed e⁄ects
DEMOC 0.871** 1.247*** 0.694 1.024**
(0.436) (0.368) (0.512) (0.445)
EDUC 0.585 0.601 0.649 0.646
(0.678) (0.671) (1.378) (1.332)
DEM*EDUC 0.292*** 0.250*
(0.109) (0.126)
OPEN 0.0135 0.0177 -0.0459 -0.0481
(0.033) (0.034) (0.048) (0.047)
ln(GDP PC) 6.891*** 6.503*** 5.979* 3.729
(1.419) (1.416) (3.021) (2.945)
ELF 3.971 3.93
(5.533) (5.146)
COMMON LAW 17.75*** 16.41***
(3.933) (3.837)
FRENCH LAW 8.755* 7.257
(4.670) (4.468)
GERMAN LAW 19.82*** 18.58***
(4.850) (4.564)










Constant -40.59*** -27.29** -2.276 24.93
(11.010) (11.590) (28.130) (25.210)
Observations 488 488 496 496
R-squared 0.19 0.209
Number of countries 106 106 109 109
Table 4: Panel data regressions: 5-year periods
35Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random e⁄ects Fixed e⁄ects
DEMOC 1.120*** 1.006** 1.256***
(0.430) (0.452) (0.459)




OPEN 0.0457** 0.0420** 0.0584** 0.0523**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
ln(GDP PC) 7.340*** 6.498*** 7.285** 5.998**
(1.834) (1.755) (3.033) (2.913)
ELF 7.341 6.226
(6.183) (5.991)
COMMON LAW 7.594* 4.244
(4.569) (4.690)
FRENCH LAW 4.289 0.871
(4.437) (4.516)
GERMAN LAW 12.33** 8.737
(5.578) (5.315)










Constant -42.29*** -14.56 -32.1 -1.247
(13.560) (14.080) (25.920) (24.710)
Observations 1925 1925 1943 1943
R-squared 0.11 0.128
Number of countries 127 127 129 129
Table 5: Panel data regressions: annual data
36Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE RE, IV FE FE, IV
DEMOC 1.587*** 1.721*** 1.480*** 1.669***
(0.156) (0.293) (0.161) (0.310)
EDUC 0.451*** 0.411*** 0.518*** 0.481***
(0.047) (0.080) (0.052) (0.078)
DEM*EDUC 0.0412*** 0.0443*** 0.0359*** 0.0397***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
OPEN 0.0525*** 0.0224 0.0599*** 0.0136
(0.015) (0.058) (0.018) (0.064)
GROWTH 9.601** 17.4 8.829** 14.7
(4.330) (205.800) (4.308) (137.400)
ELF 4.661 7.476
(5.715) (8.016)
COMMON LAW 11.28** 10.80**
(4.762) (4.986)
FRENCH LAW 4.721 4.89
(4.858) (5.056)
GERMAN LAW 18.86*** 17.71**
(6.700) (7.144)










Constant 31.18*** 30.50*** 50.99*** 52.72***
(6.680) (7.087) (1.229) (2.675)
Observations 1667 1667 1683 1683
Number of countries 116 116 118 118
R-squared 0.153
Table 6: Panel data regressions, instrumenting GDP growth
37Dependent variable: Quality of Government
(1) (2) (3)
DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
L.QOG 1.142*** 1.152*** 1.145***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
L2.QOG -0.323*** -0.312*** -0.313***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
DEMOC 0.318** 0.403*** 0.392***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.133)
DEM*EDUC 0.00703* 0.00354 0.0038
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
EDUC 0.0779** 0.0786*** 0.0648**
(0.032) (0.021) (0.028)
OPEN -0.00143 0.0033 -1.76E-05
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010)




















Observations 1455 1574 1561
Number of countries 118 118 117
AR1 test (pvalue) 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 test (pvalue) 0.16 0.13 0.12
Sargan test (pvalue) 0.12 0.02 0.02
Table 7: Panel data regressions, dynamic panel
38Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1980s
QOG 109 51.65 25.02 5.56 100
DEMOC 109 4.79 3.49 0.25 10
EDUC 88 5.15 2.85 0.5 12.04
EDUC1 109 42.81 21.6 3.5 99.5
OPEN 109 64.77 44.57 13.11 359.98
ln(GDP PC) 109 8.54 1.1 6.34 10.85
1990s
QOG 127 57.9 20.96 10.65 100
DEMOC 127 6.07 3.03 0.08 10
EDUC 106 7.53 2.83 0.98 12.73
EDUC1 127 50.81 21.14 9.5 99.5
OPEN 127 72.4 41.5 2.95 337.88
ln(GDP PC) 127 8.62 1.15 5.73 10.59
2000s
QOG 106 55.48 20.28 11.11 100
DEMOC 106 7.11 2.83 0.19 10
EDUC 106 7.53 2.83 0.98 12.73
OPEN 106 86.24 47.39 25.14 407.64
ln(GDP PC) 106 8.98 1.15 5.89 10.7
Variables with no time variation
ELF 127 0.47 0.27 0 1
COMMON LAW 127 0.3 0.46 0 1
FRENCH LAW 127 0.45 0.5 0 1
GERMAN LAW 127 0.05 0.21 0 1
SCAND. LAW 127 0.03 0.18 0 1
CATHOLIC 127 31.25 36.1 0 96.9
PROTESTANT 127 11.69 20.31 0 97.8
MUSLIM 127 24.17 36.56 0 99.8
abs(Latitude) 127 0.3 0.19 0 0.71
Table 8: Summary statistics for cross-country estimates
39Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
10-year panel
QOG overall 57.36 21.8 9.1 100 N = 304
between 20.38 12.13 99.85 n = 109
within 7.29 35.52 83.44 T-bar = 2.79
DEMOC overall 6.38 3.17 0.08 10 N = 304
between 2.85 0.24 10 n = 109
within 1.29 1.15 9.68 T-bar = 2.79
EDUC overall 6.5 2.97 0.44 12.73 N = 304
between 2.87 0.82 12.38 n = 109
within 0.91 4.37 8.72 T-bar = 2.79
OPEN overall 75.63 44.92 13.11 407.64 N = 304
between 42.54 19.98 368.5 n = 109
within 12.34 22.24 120.2 T-bar = 2.79
ln(GDP PC) overall 8.88 1.1 5.89 11.13 N = 304
between 1.09 6.02 10.94 n = 109
within 0.19 8.2 9.56 T-bar = 2.79
5-year panel
QOG overall 58.13 21.61 9.81 100 N = 496
between 20.02 12.5 99.82 n = 109
within 7.27 34.99 89.38 T-bar = 4.55
DEMOC overall 6.6 3.11 0 10 N = 496
between 2.87 0.2 10 n = 109
within 1.17 0.31 10.15 T-bar = 4.55
EDUC overall 6.76 2.94 0.28 13.09 N = 496
between 2.87 0.88 12.47 n = 109
within 0.79 4.56 8.95 T-bar = 4.55
OPEN overall 76.75 45.69 12.63 443.23 N = 496
between 42.87 20.27 369.47 n = 109
within 13.34 15.55 150.52 T-bar = 4.55
ln(GDP PC) overall 8.9 1.12 5.87 11.03 N = 496
between 1.1 6 10.82 n = 109
within 0.18 8.18 9.63 T-bar = 4.55
Annual panel
QOG overall 55.76 23.59 4.17 100 N = 1943
between 21.15 12.83 100 n = 129
within 9.1 25.15 89.44 T-bar = 15.06
DEMOC overall 5.58 3.43 0 10 N = 1943
between 3.09 0.22 10 n = 129
within 1.45 -0.14 10.87 T-bar = 15.06
EDUC1 overall 47.39 21.63 3.5 99.5 N = 1943
between 20.96 8.19 99.5 n = 129
within 4.31 34.15 56.65 T-bar = 15.06
OPEN overall 67.89 44.26 1.98 376.3 N = 1943
between 40.76 9.97 338.39 n = 129
within 16.12 -68.6 246.59 T-bar = 15.06
ln(GDP PC) overall 8.61 1.16 5.03 11.01 N = 1943
between 1.13 6.29 10.75 n = 129
within 0.16 7.35 9.64 T-bar = 15.06
Table 9: Summary statistics for Panel data
40Variable Description and Sources
QOG ICRG indicator of Quality of Government obtained as the mean value
of the ICRG variables ￿Corruption￿, ￿Law and Order￿and ￿Bureau-
cracy Quality￿, scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of
government. Downloaded from www.qog.pol.gu.se (the name of the
variable in the QOG dataset is QOG)
DEMOC Index of democracy obtained as an average of the Polity and Freedom
House indexes of democracy. Downloaded from www.qog.pol.gu.se
(the name of the variable in the QOG dataset is fh polity2)
EDUC Average numbers of years of education. Source: Barro and Lee (2010)
EDUC1 Index of Knowledge Distribution (Vanhanen 2003a; 2003b). Down-
loaded from www.qog.pol.gu.se (the name of the variable in the QOG
dataset is van knowdist)
OPEN Trade openness (source: Penn World tables)
ln(GDP PC) Log GDP real per capita in PPP (source: Penn World Tables)
ELF Ethnic Fractionalization from Fearon (2003). Downloaded from
www.qog.pol.gu.se (the name of the variable in the QOG dataset is
fe etfra)
COMMON LAW Dummy variable that takes a value of one for countries with a common
law legal origin. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
FRENCH LAW Dummy variable that takes a value of one for countries with a French
legal origin. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
GERMAN LAW Dummy variable that takes a value of one for countries with a German
legal origin. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
SCAND. LAW Dummy variable that takes a value of one for countries with a Scan-
dinavian legal origin. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
SOC. LAW Dummy variable that takes a value of one for countries with a socialist
legal origin. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
CATHOLIC Share of Catholics in the population. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
PROTESTANT Share of Protestant in the population. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
MUSLIM Share of Muslim in the population. Source La Porta et al. (1998)
abs(Latitude) Absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to
take values between 0 and 1). Source: La Porta et al. (1998)
RSHOCK Real external shock. Source: Jaimovich and Panizza (2006)
Table 10: De￿nition of variables and sources
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